2025.05.14國昌質詢｜昇銳中國製監視器流入軍方國軍營區 監視器主機竟可連線至中國？國家資安何在？官員稱其為小額採購沒有呈報司令部審核 昇銳電子涉偽標MIT標籤取得政府標案 要求失職的國防部求償追責

2025.05.14國昌質詢｜昇銳中國製監視器流入軍方國軍營區 監視器主機竟可連線至中國？國家資安何在？官員稱其為小額採購沒有呈報司令部審核 昇銳電子涉偽標MIT標籤取得政府標案 要求失職的國防部求償追責 

 

#國昌質詢 

民進黨政府從上到下歷次宣示「資安就是國安」，結果我先前質詢卓榮泰院長，號稱安控國家隊的昇銳電子竟然進口中國製監視器改標MIT，大量裝設於國防軍事要塞、各大關鍵基礎設施，資通安全研究院更示警昇銳監視器主機有連線至中國，整個政府卻毫無掌握，令人不敢置信！

根據數位部的回覆資料，僅國發會、交通部與數位部就使用3400多項昇銳產品，簡直駭人聽聞！今天國防部官員也承認，早於5月2號就已清查出使用954項昇銳產品，那為何至今國防部都未回覆資料？到底是在遮掩什麼？

更重要的是，國防部說，954項昇銳產品已經停用，但明明不能使用中國貼牌貨，結果抓到只有停用，都不用向廠商求償？難道要納稅人買單？我要求國防部究責到底。

還不只有昇銳電子，我接獲檢舉，並於今年4月現勘陸軍龍門營區確認，裝設中國品牌的交換器，甚至還有一台由陸軍司令部直接發放至營區，這到底是怎麼回事？「資安就是國安」就只是口號？國防部應徹底檢討並究責！

備詢官員：國防部長顧立雄

資料與影片來源：【國昌質詢】真把資安當國安？國防部螺絲掉滿地｜2025-05-14｜外交及國防委員會 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TimSMZkk1ZQ @KC-Huang #黃國昌  #HuangKuoChang #taiwan  #legislator #太離譜了

Translation:

The Democratic Progressive Party(DPP) government has consistently proclaimed that "cybersecurity is national security." Yet, during my previous questioning of Premier Cho Jung-tai(卓榮泰), I uncovered a deeply troubling contradiction to this very principle.

Hi Sharp Intelligence(昇銳電子), a company claiming to be part of Taiwan's national security control framework, was found to have imported surveillance equipment manufactured in China, falsely relabeled it as "Made in Taiwan," and installed these devices in critical military and infrastructure zones. This is not mere negligence—it is a grave breach of national security.

Even more alarming, the National Institute of Cyber Security(國家資通安全研究院) had already issued warnings about Hi Sharp Intelligence's surveillance systems having direct links to China. Despite this, the government remained completely unaware. This level of oversight is not only unacceptable—it is utterly incomprehensible.

According to a response from the Ministry of Digital Affairs(數位發展部), over 3,400 Hi Sharp Intelligence devices have been deployed across just three agencies: the National Development Council(國家發展委員會), the  Ministry of Transportation and Communications(交通部), and the Ministry of Digital Affairs. This revelation alone is staggering. Furthermore, officials from the Ministry of National Defense have now admitted that, as of May 2, they had identified 954 Hi Sharp Intelligence devices in use within their own operations.

Why was there no disclosure or action until now? What is the Ministry of National Defense attempting to conceal?

Even more concerning is the Ministry's claim that these 954 devices have merely been "deactivated." Given that Chinese-made equipment is explicitly banned due to national security concerns, simply taking these devices offline is wholly insufficient. Why has the government not demanded accountability or pursued compensation from the manufacturer? Once again, are the people of Taiwan expected to bear the cost of the government's failures?

This is not an isolated issue. In April of this year, I personally inspected the Longmen(龍門) Army Base and confirmed the presence of Chinese-branded network switches on-site—one of which was directly issued by the Army Command Headquarters(國防部陸軍司令部) itself. This represents nothing short of a systemic failure.

So I ask again: Is "cybersecurity is national security" merely an empty slogan, or is it a commitment this government is prepared to uphold?

The Ministry of National Defense must launch a full investigation and take decisive disciplinary action against those responsible.

Official to answer interpellation：Minister of National Defense Wellington Koo (顧立雄)

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#黃國昌 #HuangKuoChang #台灣民眾黨 #立法院質詢 #國會監督 #揭弊 #國防部 #昇銳電子 #偽標事件 #政府採購 #中國製設備 #國安漏洞 #貼牌貨風波 #ChineseSurveillance #CyberSecurity #NationalSecurity #TaiwanSecurity #TaiwanPolitics